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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The Communauté Financière d'Afrique (CFA), which stands for African Financial Community, 
is a centralized monetary system that links two currencies: the West African CFA franc and 
the Central African CFA franc to the Euro zone. The African Financial Community was 
constituted in 1945 after the end of WWII and it was subjected to different variations over time. 
Initially, the CFA franc (CFAF) was fixed at a rate of 50 CFAF per French franc (FF) and in 
1994 the rate changed to 100 CFAF per FF because of a devaluation. Once the euro started to 
circulate, the CFAF was pegged to the European currency. Until present day, 12 former French 
colonies in Africa still use the CFAF, which has a fixed exchange rate to euro, guaranteed by 
the French Treasury (FT). The financial community consists of the West African Economic & 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Central African Economic & Monetary Union (CAEMU), 
each with its own central bank that distributes the two CFAF currencies issued by the French 
Treasury.1 
2 
                                                 
 
1 “A Brief History of The CFA Franc,” African Business Magazine. 
2 Centro Panafricano, “Franco CFA ¿hacia una nueva devaluación?,” Africanidad, (2011). 
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 French national interests shaped the structure of CFA institutions and financial regulations. 
The main features of the Franc zone were designed during the colonial period and they have 
been functional until present day. For instance, a controversial condition of the zone is the 
deposit of 50% of foreign exchange reserves in an Operation Account (OA) in the FT by each 
CFA member state. Initially, CFA countries had to deposit in the OA 100% of their foreign 
assets until 1973. An agreement signed in the same year by France and CFA member states 
decreased the required deposit to 65% and finally in 2005 the rate went down to 50%.3 
 
My main research question states that because of a set of economic and political conditions, 
the CFA Franc zone negatively affects the economic growth and sovereignty of Francophone 
Africa. In this study, I investigate the mechanisms that cause the latter in order to identify the 
relation between CFA membership and the lack of economic sovereignty and development. 
The insufficient development of CFA countries, the financial restrictions linked to the 
monetary system, and the rise of African resentment towards CFAF will be the premise to reply 
to the research question and show how the disadvantages of the CFAF prevail over the benefits. 
This paper argues that CFA membership may not be as favourable for Francophone Africa as 
it was declared. 
 
To better understand the Franc zone, in the second chapter of this paper discusses about the 
historical origins of the CFA monetary system and what kind of organizational and legislative 
changes there were over the years. It is important to note that the Franc zone was established 
during the French colonial period in Africa. 
The historical analysis of the second chapter points out that the structure of the Franc zone 
remained almost unchanged over time. The colonial roots of CFA membership are an important 
aspect to take into consideration throughout the research, as it suggests that the impoverishment 
and economic dependence of former French African colonies may not be casual. On the 
contrary, the CFA Franc zone allowed France to keep its former colonies to a dependent status, 
consequently limiting the economic prospect of progress and financial autonomy of 
Francophone Africa. 4  The necessity of France to continue its economic influence over 
                                                 
 
 
3 Article 11, Convention de Coopération Monétaire entre la France et les Etats membres de la B.E.A.C., (1973). 
4 Ndongo Samba Sylla, “The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa,” Africa at LSE, (2017). 
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Francophone Africa after decolonization is clear in a statement made by the former French 
President F. Mitterand in 1993. He admits that France’s high-ranking among the Great Powers 
depends and always depended on the geopolitical importance of Francophone Africa.5 
 
Chapter 3 will analyse the economic disadvantages caused by the main CFA features, which 
were set during the colonial era. The paper argues that the structure of the monetary system 
causes social-economic adversity, despite the limited benefits gained from the exchange rate 
stability and low inflation guaranteed by CFA institutions. Having established the damaging 
effects of the Franc zone, the paper continues to identify the actors who benefit the most from 
the CFA system; such as French corporates and corrupted African élite who are loyal to France 
and their private interests. Through this, the extent to which the WAEMU and CAEMU are 
subjected to an economic order that promotes private interests, rather than collective ones, is 
further explained.6 
 
At this point of the research, having created an understanding of the damaging effects of the 
CFAF on Francophone Africa’s economic growth and autonomy, chapter 4 continues to 
disclose the controversial link of the CFAF to the colonial matrix of power, an oppressive and 
hierarchical structure at the base of Franco-African relations. 
 
Methods 
 
This research undertakes using qualitative method of research. The design of the thesis is based 
on a single case study, that is the CFA Franc zone. A monetary system unique in its kind. The 
14 CFA member states are in fact the only countries in the world that have a currency which is 
issued from a foreign non-member state. To be more precise, a country that is not located in 
the same continent as CFA states, a country that historically linked itself to Africa through 
oppressive patterns. 
 
                                                 
 
5 Bernard Cassen, “Une francophonie mutilée,” Le Monde diplomatique, (1991). 
6 Ahoua Don Mello, “Le franc CFA, arme de destruction massive contre le développement africain,” 
Investig’Action. 
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As previously explained the CFA conditions that undermine the economic sovereignty and 
development of Francophone Africa, the study interrogates the meaning of such conditions that 
characterized the Franc zone since its establishment during French colonialism. Because of the 
important interrelation between the colonial roots of the CFAF and the enduring 
impoverishment and subjugation of Francophone Africa, the research initially has a historical 
narrative-based explanation.7 The latter method is combined with a theory-based explanation 
on the last part of the thesis. The study uses the analytical framework of the theory of coloniality 
of power to argue whether the CFAF is a product of the colonial matrix of power. As a matter 
of fact, coloniality refers to the power relations that remained unchanged since colonialism 
until present day and still influence different dimensions, such as culture and economy. In other 
words, coloniality subsists regardless of colonialism.  
The sociologist A. Quijano identified four dimensions that are affected by coloniality and two 
of them, control of the economy and authority, can be viewed in the power relations between 
France and CFA member states.8 
Moreover, the theoretical framework of neo-colonialism guides me to interrogate whether the 
CFAF can be viewed as a neo-colonial tool, which allows France to maintain its economic 
authority over Francophone Africa. 
 
The data was collected from primary and secondary resources through in-depth reading, 
because of the textual format. The collected data was both in French and English and included 
government publications, interviews, books and academic journals. 
 
A weakness of the thesis is the limited amount of financial data regarding the CFAF; for 
instance, the outcome of macroeconomic shocks on the Franc zone and the CFA policies of 
fiscal discipline. Also, the inaccessibility of Franco-African trade agreements restricts the 
analysis of the research. Nevertheless, the goal of my research is not to gather economic data, 
observe it and test it with formulas. Rather than following empiricist orthodoxy and only having 
economic variables, the paper focuses on understanding the outcomes of the economic and 
political conditions of the zone from an interpretative and critical perspective. It is a way to 
unpack the assumptions about the positive effects of the CFAF, such as monetary stability and 
                                                 
 
77 Jack S. Levy, “Qualitative Research Methods,” (2006). 
8 Anibal, Quijano,”Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” Cultural Studies, (2007):168–178. 
      8 
S2093227 
low inflation.9 Taking as an example the work by Robert W. Cox, the paper does not aim to 
limit the knowledge about the CFAF to an empirical observation of financial trends. On the 
contrary, the thesis aims at contributing to the existing literature with a ground-breaking 
research, which will question the underlying hierarchical and oppressive power structure of 
Franco-African relations. The latter is deepened in the part of the thesis, which better explains 
the chosen theoretical frameworks. 
Although there is limited statistical data to prove the causality between CFAF and 
African impoverishment and dependency, this study demonstrates the theoretical relationship 
through two main analytical frameworks: coloniality of power and neo-colonialism. The 
research may seem fragile because of the lack of rigour, but like Aradau and Huysmans 
explained in one article: methods can also be viewed as acts that critically disrupt assumptions 
that are taken for granted or neglected.10 In this case, the disregarded interdependence between 
the negative economic trends of CFA countries and the persistent colonial structure of the Franc 
zone. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
The economic consequences of the CFA monetary system are multifaceted; there are both 
positive and negative effects. However, it can be argued that the disadvantages of the CFAF 
outweigh the advantages. After 60 years of political independence, the financial trend of 
Francophone Africa remained relatively stable, in comparison to those African countries that 
witnessed a higher economic growth. 
This paper seeks to explore the CFA conditions that hinder member states to achieve 
economic autonomy and development. The general notions of critical political economy theory 
can help to observe the economic inadequacies caused by CFAF and identify those financial 
and political features that are interconnected.11 
                                                 
 
9 Christopher Lamont, “Research Methods in International Relations,” (2015): 19-21. 
10 Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans “Critical methods in International Relations: The politics of techniques, 
devices and acts,” (2013): 612-613. 
11 Gary Browning and Andrew Kilmister, Critical and Post-Critical Political Economy, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), 3-5. 
      9 
S2093227 
After having identified the historical and contemporary damaging mechanisms, the study 
investigates to what extent the Franc zone and its structure can be analysed through the 
theoretical lens of coloniality of power and neo-colonialism. 
The concepts of coloniality of power and neo-colonialism allow to answer to my research 
question, demonstrating the link between the unchanged colonial features of the Franc zone 
and the restricted economic sovereignty and growth of CFA countries.12 Thus, recognising the 
CFAF as a product of the French colonial matrix of power and a contemporary neo-colonial 
device, as it pursues to profit from CFA territories and maintain them subordinated.13 
 The notion of neo-colonialism was developed by Kwame Nkrumah who published a 
book in 1965 entitled Neo-colonialism, The Last stage of Imperialism; in which he defines it 
as a process through which foreign countries indirectly control the economic and political 
spheres of former colonies.14 
 
The relevance of this study lies in the limited availability of academic studies, which link the 
discourse of the Franc zone to the notion of the colonial matrix of power and the theory of neo-
colonialism. By acknowledging the coloniality in Franco-African economic power relations, it 
is possible to understand those enduring oppressive patterns that characterize the French 
colonial hierarchy, which has been at the base of Franco-African relations for centuries. 
The element of continuation is essential to understand the relation between the CFA and the 
contemporary limited economic autonomy and development of Francophone Africa. The 
studies that researched neo-colonial patterns often concentrated on the indirect economic and 
political domination from former colonial powers in emerging countries. Thus, neglecting the 
structure of the colonial matrix of power: an element that further underlies the racist and 
exploitative hierarchy of international relations and of financial capitalism. 
Through the concept of the coloniality of power, this study deconstructs the hegemonic 
assumptions that only look at the economic advantages of the CFAF. Furthermore, using the 
analysis of the French colonial legacy, this paper further captures the extent to which France 
has perpetuated an oppressive monetary system since colonialism to this day. 
                                                 
 
12 “Critical Race and Postcolonial Theory,” Social Theory re-wired. 
13 Diana, Haag, “Mechanisms of Neo-colonialism Current French and British influence in Cameroon and 
Ghana,” International Catalan Institute for Peace, (2012). 
14 Kwame, Nkrumah, “Neo-colonialism, The Last stage of Imperialism,” (1965):1. 
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The framework of coloniality is an autonomous paradigm that was initially designated by South 
American scholars, who found themselves in the subjugated side of knowledge production 
relations. Their independent thought had the objective of opposing the supremacy of Western 
academic discourses 15 ; for this reason, it is also valid to investigate the damages in 
Francophone Africa caused by the French imposition of CFAF. 
Furthermore, the notion of coloniality of power comes along with a counterreaction, that is 
decoloniality and the incomplete African liberatory project, which started with the process of 
decolonization. 
As Walter Mignolo remarks, ‘Decolonial thinking strives to delink itself from the imposed 
dichotomies articulated in the West, namely the knower and the known, the subject and the object, 
theory and praxis.’16 
Hence, decooloniality seeks to dismantle the relations of power and knowledge production that 
characterize coloniality, which is a multidimensional matrix that shaped and keeps shaping 
world’s epistemologies and geopolitical relations.17 
 
The thesis represents a decolonial research, as it delinks knowledge by challenging the 
assumption that Francophone Africa would lose foreign investments and economic stability 
without the CFA monetary system and France’s financial guidance; a rhetoric that hides a 
colonial and racist attitude that still characterizes Franco-African policies. 
For instance, the common supposition that France brought modernity to Africa and saved its 
people. Yet, modernity and coloniality are the two sides of the same coin that perpetuates 
French dominance and exploitation.18 
 In order to achieve a decolonial study, the thesis engages with a critical perspective on 
knowledge production, with the aim of raising awareness of the pervasive hierarchy of forms 
of knowledge and communication.19 It is in fact fundamental to recognize the preservation of 
an epistemological model that indirectly promotes Western superiority through notions that 
have colonial roots and perpetuate long-term knowledge inequalities.20 
                                                 
 
15 Domenico, Lepre, “L’Afrique subsaharienne entre décolonisation et néocolonialisme. Débat sur l’ingérence 
politique, économique et culturelle de l’Ouest à la fin du XXe siècle,” Politics, (2015): 40. 
16 Walter D. Mignolo, “Coloniality Is Far from Over, and So Must Be Decoloniality,” (2009): 42. 
17 Sabelo Ndlovu—Gatsheni, “Decoloniality as the Future of Africa,” History Compass, (2015): 489. 
18 Walter, Mignolo, “Coloniality of power and de-colonial thinking,” Cultural Studies, (2007): 162. 
19 Susana Narotzky, “The production of knowledge and the production of Hegemony: anthropological theory 
and political struggles in Spain,” Journal of the World Anthropology Network, (2005): 35. 
20 Michael, Herzfeld, "Theorizing Europe: Persuasive Paradoxes" in Asad et al. 
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The former framework allows the study to debunk the colonial assumptions of the efficiency 
and advantages of the CFA monetary system. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
The existing literature regarding the Franc zone usually analyses the monetary system from an 
economic perspective, taking into consideration the advantages for the member countries; such 
as economic stability and credibility. 
There are Western scholars, such as James Boughton21 and David Fielding22, who supported 
the French foreign and economic policies with optimism, describing the alleged economic 
stability of the CFAF and the benefits gained by France and other European states. 
Martin Hallet writes about the way in which the CFAF’s fixation to the euro has helped 
CFA countries to reach macroeconomic stability and trade integration23. Another category of 
existing literature about the CFAF is a set of studies that exclusively focus on Franco-African 
relations, without considering the economic impact of France’s foreign policies on 
Francophone Africa.24 
Most of the authors of the existing scholarly literature neglect the fact that stability and 
low inflation rates are not sufficient for economic growth within the Franc zone. Moreover, the 
success of trade integration has remained limited to French corporation, the African political 
élite and the domestic entrepreneurs trading with Western multinationals.25 
At the same time, intra-regional trade remains underdeveloped because of financial and 
administrative CFA restrictions. For instance, WAEMU and CAEMU have two different 
CFAF currencies that have not been interconvertible with one another since 1993 and it is first 
necessary to exchange currency with the French Treasury.26 
                                                 
 
"Provocations of European Ethnology", American Anthropologist, (1997): 713-30. 
21 James Boughton, “The economics of the CFA franc zone,” Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency 
Unions,” (1993): 96-106. 
22 David Fielding, “The Macroeconomics of Monetary Union. An Analysis of the CFA Franc Zone,” (2002). 
23 Martin Hallet, “The role of the euro in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the CFA franc zone,” Economic Papers, 
Economic & Financial Affairs, (2008). 
24 Nicolas, van de Walle “The Decline of the Franc Zone: Monetary Politics in Francophone Africa,” African 
Affairs, (1991): 385. 
25 Kako Nubukpo, Bruno Tinel, Martial-Ze Belinga, Demba Moussa Dembélé, “Sortir l’Afrique de la servitude 
monétaire: A qui profite le franc CFA?,” La Dispute, (2016). 
26 “History of the CFA franc,” BCEAO. 
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The studies that analyse the CFAF from a critical perspective are usually marginalized and for 
certain years the topic was almost considered a taboo. 
However, contemporary academic literature seems to have shifted, especially among pan-
Africanist and critical scholars, such as K. Nubukpo, S. Samba and N. Agbohou. They propose 
a new point of view that questions the underlying neo-colonial intentions of the CFA system, 
and it advances an analytical diagnosis of its damaging outcomes. 
For years, it was difficult to bring critical theories regarding the CFAF to the public, primarily 
because of the hierarchical relations of knowledge production between France and 
Francophone Africa. 
 
In 2016 a book entitled “Liberate Africa from Monetary Slavery: Who Profits from the CFA 
Franc?” was published by a group of African and European scholars, triggering the rise of an 
anti-CFA social movement. The CFAF became part of a public debate and various African 
economists, such as K. Nubukpo and H.C. Oyima released critical statements about the 
monetary system, arguing that CFA member states should withdraw from the zone and 
establish a currency that truly brings prosperity to African people.27 
An important representor of the anti-CFA movement is Kemi Séba, activist who founded the 
NGO “SOS Pan-Africa” and organised various protests around Africa to raise awareness of the 
damaging effects of the CFAF. K. Séba claims that despite decolonization, Francophone Africa 
is economically tied to France and lacks sovereignty due to the CFAF.28 
The emerging African social movement was inspired by pan-Africanist values and the 
primary request of the movement is the withdrawal of African countries from the CFA 
monetary system.29 The increasing discontent toward the zone indicates a rise of African 
people claiming their right to self-determination. When Kemi Séba burnt a CFA note in Senegal, 
he was temporarily imprisoned, and his gesture consequently brought attention to a forgotten 
topic. Séba’s act can be referred to as an act of disobedient conservatism. An enactment shaped 
by anger with the intention of healing through decolonial thinking and re-existence.30 The 
                                                 
 
27 Ndongo Samba Sylla, “The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa,” Africa at LSE, (2017). 
28 Abdur, Rahman, Alfa, Shaban, “Anti-CFA activist Kemi Seba is 2017 Africanews Personality of the Year,” 
AfricaNews, (2018). 
29 Ndongo Samba Sylla, “The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa,” Africa at LSE, (2017). 
30 Walter D. Mignolo, “Coloniality Is Far from Over, and So Must Be Decoloniality,” (2009): 40-41. 
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relevance of his act lies on the attempt to transcend reality and its imposed forms of knowledge 
that restrict the capacity of re-thinking and re-learning new economic, political, social and 
cultural models. Séba demonstrated that individuals alone can challenge the colonial matrix of 
power, advocating for transformation and critical thinking regarding the CFAF.31 
 
The proposal of the withdrawal of member states from the Franc zone may seem unrealistic 
and problematic, but there are valid arguments in favour. For instance, the economies of 
Francophone Africa strongly depend on the export of agricultural products and natural 
resources, which are frequently hit by trade shocks. Despite the low level of inflation, the CFAF 
fixed exchange rate does not help to reduce the damaging impact of financial shocks on 
member states.32 As Mr. Wilfrid René M’Voula of the Gabonese Ministry of Economy and 
Finance argues, a flexible exchange rate would allow CFA countries to make the financial 
adjustments needed by their local economies and improve their capability to compete in the 
trade market.33 
 
The Franc zone has colonial origins and it represents a French project masked with a post-
colonial slogan of financial cooperation and stability, while being a hierarchical monetary 
system that manipulates the economic structure of African countries and damages their growth.  
Francophone Africa finds itself trapped in a cycle of economic dependence, a situation in which 
France’s economic growth negatively affects CFA countries.34 The CFA monetary system can 
therefore be regarded as the continuation of France’s colonial legacy that inhibits African 
countries from having a decolonized relationship with France. 
By critically investigating the hidden core of the Franc zone and the economic impediments 
for African development, the research will unpack the neo-colonial features of the CFAF and 
France’s financial partnership with Francophone Africa. 
 
                                                 
 
31 Neo Maseko, “Transformative Praxis Through Critical Consciousness: A Conceptual 
Exploration of a Decolonial Access With Success Agenda,” Educational Research for Social Change, (2018). 
32 Shantayanan Devarajan, Dani Rodrik, “Do the benefits of fixed exchange rates outweigh their costs? The 
franc zone in Africa,” Nber working papers series, (1991). 
33 Jacqueline Irving, “Varied impact on Africa expected from new European currency. For better or for worse: 
the euro and the CFA franc,” Africa Recovery, (1999): 25-26. 
34Theotonio, Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” The American Economic Review, (1970). 
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The critical perspective from which I am tackling this research question is fundamental because 
there is a need for decolonial thinking, in order to disengage from a global viewpoint that is 
imposed on FA and the international community.35 
My thesis project acknowledges the main critical arguments and their reference to neo-
colonialism, as it recognizes the extent to which the CFAF has negatively affected the 
economic performance of FA, partially because of the ongoing significant role of France’s 
influence on directing African economic policies.36 
However, my analytical strategy differs from previous critical arguments because it 
includes the theory of coloniality of power. It is important to acknowledge that CFAF’s 
negative impact on member states is a deliberate result of the zone’s conditions; economic 
conditions were imposed by France, in accordance to a global and racist system of capitalist 
power, based on the control and exploitation of African resources, labour and lands.37 
  
                                                 
 
35 Walter D. Mignolo, “Coloniality of power and de-colonial thinking,” Cultural Studies, (2007): 159. 
36 Kwame Nkrumah, “Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism,” (1965). 
37 Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa,” African Books Collective, (2013). 
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Chapter 2 
History of the Franc Zone 
 
CFAF during colonialism and decolonization 
 
In 1853 the Bank of Senegal was instituted, and it represented the first modern private bank in 
West Africa, and it was financed by some of the French compensation to the former slave 
owners. In 1904 the latter bank evolved to the current Bank of West Africa (BAO). Although 
it was initially a private bank, the governmental Colonial Bank Monitoring Commission 
oversaw the enterprise and many colonial officials were moved to work at the Bank of West 
Africa. The main task of the BAO was to guarantee the convertibility of the currencies in 
Francophone Africa with the French Franc. Because of this important monetary monopoly held 
by the BAO, after WWII the French government started to increase its influence on the private 
bank, until it was able to take 32% equity share; hence gaining direct control of the BAO’s 
administration. Besides the change of management and the new requirement of French 
governmental approval for BAO’s activities, the bank had to open new financial agencies 
throughout the territories of the French empire. The former modifications were driven by 
France’s own economic interests and they helped to increase the amount of money circulating 
from France to Africa and vice versa.38 In other words, the establishment of the CFA franc 
zone introduced a system, through which France maintained a certain authority upon its 
colonies’ economic sphere.39 
 The BAO became a monetary institution characterized by centralization and restriction, 
as the French colonies could have only a certain amount of circulating currency, according to 
the quantity of mineral and agricultural resources traded with France. It is clear how this 
colonial monetary system damaged African economies, by limiting for example the 
possibilities of Francophone Africa to differentiate its local production.40 
 
                                                 
 
38 Eric Hallerberg, “Costs And Benefits Of Monetary Union: A Study Of The CFA Franc Zone,” (1990): 13-15. 
39 Gary K. Busch, “Les effets economiques et politiques de la zone CFA,” Ocnus.Net, (2008). 
40 Ibidem, 15. 
      16 
S2093227 
During the 1930s, France instituted different currencies in the African colonies, each currency 
linked to the French franc. This system is considered as the anticipation of the CFA franc 
zone.41 
On the 26th of December in 1945, the French president C. de Gaulle, together with the finance 
minister R. Pleven and the minister of the colonies J. Soustelle, they approved a mandate that 
permitted the creation of the French African Colonial Franc of the Colonies françaises 
d'Afrique42. Around 1958-1960 the name of the monetary system was modified to Communauté 
française d'Afrique43 and it was finally changed to Communauté Financière Africaine, once all 
the French colonies reached political independence.44. 
The main objective of the CFA franc zone was to facilitate France’s control over the financial 
system and the natural resources of the African colonies, whilst advancing a certain degree of 
economic integration within Francophone Africa.45 
Nevertheless, one of the initial reasons that led to the creation of a common monetary 
system was the economic crisis of 1929. The latter event highlighted the vulnerability of the 
global financial system, consequently influencing the French government to institute a 
legislation of fixed exchange rate between France and the territories of its colonial empire.46 
In other words, France was witnessing the decline of its political and economic influence and 
it began to feel threatened by the rise of Germany and the U.S.A. 
France’s fear became reality with the devastating Nazi occupation. What is often neglected 
about the German invasion of France is that the Nazis implemented an exploitative economic 
system, that transferred to Germany an enormous amount of French foreign exchange 
reserves47. For instance, in 1941 France was forced to export its resources and commodities to 
Germany first, while importing German products. In addition, German officers began to have 
control over French financial institutions. They modified the rate exchange between the Franc 
and the Mark, and they established OA like the current CFA ones.48 
                                                 
 
41 Ibidem, 7. 
42 In English: “French Colonies of Africa”. 
43 In English: “French Community of Africa”. 
44 In English: “African Financial Community”. 
45 Ndongo Samba Sylla, “The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa,” Africa at LSE, (2017). 
46 Priscille Guinant, “La politique de la France en Afrique subsaharienne après les indépendances,” I.E.P. de 
Toulouse, (2012/2013): 11. 
47 René Sédillot, “Le Franc enchaîné, histoire de la monnaie française pendant la guerre et l'occupation,” (1945). 
48 Pierre Arnoult, “Les finances de la France et l’occupation allemande,” Presses universitaires de France, 
(1951): 50. 
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The Nazi monetary policies that were applied in the occupied territories influenced French 
statemen to institute the CFAF.49 
After being subjugated by Germany, France became the new oppressor and implemented 
monetary policies like the Nazis’ ones to its African colonies.50 The economic integration of 
French African colonies was part of a geopolitical strategy to guarantee France’s survival as a 
European power, by maintaining intact its empire and guarantying access to French products 
in African markets.51 France’s colonial strategy was a tool to support French competitivity in 
global markets through its access to the colonies’ monetary resources.52 
 
In the 1950s, France confronted the rise of a social and political movement within Francophone 
Africa that advocated for African independence. One of the most crucial events was the conflict 
in Algeria, as it induced France to dissolve the Parliament in 1958 and become a semi-
presidential republic with the return of C. de Gaulle. With the formation of the Fifth French 
Republic, the government offered two propositions to its African colonies: complete 
independence from France or political autonomy within an economic community that would 
include France and its colonies.53 
Guinea was the first country to grant itself independence from France in 1958 and it 
was the only country among the twelve French colonies that refused De Gaulle’s second 
proposition, and instead voted to instantly have total autonomy. Sékou Touré, back then the 
president of Guinea, successfully advocated for the withdrawal from the CFA franc zone, in 
order to reach a degree of economic independence. In his words, 
 
We have told you bluntly, Mr President, what the demands of the people are. We have one prime and 
essential need: our dignity. But there is no dignity without freedom. We prefer freedom in poverty to 
opulence in slavery.54 
 
Guinea’s unexpected decision aggravated political and economic relations with France, as De 
Gaulle ordered to end financial aid and cooperation with the new independent African state. 
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To punish and destabilize Guinea’s economy, France secretly imported counterfeit Guinean 
Franc and supported both financially and military the opposition.55 
Later in the years, Djibouti, Madagascar and Mauritania followed Guinea’s example and they 
started to issue their own national currency. In 1962 Mali as well left the CFA franc zone but 
joined it once again in 1984. 
Despite having gained political autonomy, most of the former African colonies were still 
dependent on French financial aid and trade arrangements, since there was not a complete 
change with colonial economic agreements.56 
 
Organizational & legislative variations of the Franc Zone  
 
As it was already mentioned, the CFA franc zone is divided in two areas, each one with its own 
currency and the two CFA francs are not interconvertible. In one area the West African 
Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) is in charge and its member states are: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau (former Portuguese colony). 
Whereas the member states of the Central African Economic Monetary Union (CAEMU) are 
the following: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Chad and 
Equatorial Guinea (former Portuguese colony). 
Both monetary unions are characterized by economic and social inequality among member 
states; for instance, western and central coastal countries are richer and they have better 
climatic conditions, in comparison to land-locked ones. 57  Besides national and regional 
differences among CFA countries, the institutions of CAEMU are less elaborate in comparison 
to the monetary mechanisms of WAEMU, hence more dependant to France.58 As a matter of 
fact, French interventionism is stronger in those African countries with weaker economic 
institutions and/or more corrupted political élite.59  
The CFA franc zone consists of: The Conference of Heads of State, the Council of 
Ministers, the banking committee, the committee of WAEMU and CAEMU and finally the two 
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central banks, Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) and Banque des 
États de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC)60.  
The Conference of Head of State represents the supreme authority and it has the power to 
decide which countries can join the zone or be excluded from it, every decision is taken through 
unanimity.61 Furthermore, the Council of Ministers is the institution that defines the monetary 
policies;62 whilst the principal task of the two supranational banks is to fix the exchange rate 
of the CFAF with the value of the euro.63 Each bank has a Council of Administration with 
representants from the CFA member states of the corresponding union. For instance, the 
BCEAO has sixteen African administrators (two per country) and two French delegates with 
veto rights64; whereas the BEAC has ten African administrators and three French appointees.65 
 
Once the CFA franc zone was established, there was a standardization of business law, which 
facilitated the intensification of economic liberalization and trade between France and 
Francophone Africa. Thus, it became easier for French corporations and banks to enter the 
markets of the former French colonies.66 
The CFA monetary system is considered as a tool to enhance financial cooperation with France 
and within Francophone Africa, since it is believed that the fixed exchange rate with the euro 
makes the CFAF a more stable and reliable currency.  The CFA system has in fact reduced the 
rate of inflation of CFA states, in comparison to neighbouring countries.67 
Moreover, the fact that France guarantees convertibility for the CFAF is viewed as an economic 
assurance to maintain the currency stable. Besides offering financial advantages to member 
states, the Franc zone provides a certain degree of policy credibility. Each has an operational 
account in the FT and France is part of the administrative board of WAEMU and CAEMU.68 
Additionally, the CFAF is considered as a strong currency that promotes trade with European 
countries.69 
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By analysing the CFA franc zone historically, it is possible to see how in the 1960s the CFA 
institutions were not well structured; for this reason, France and Francophone Africa focused 
on the expansion of administrational and commercial institutes. 
In the 1970s a wave of Western investments, especially from France, began to finance the 
development of Francophone Africa. However, in the following years the economic disparities 
between the Franc zone and other monetary unions increased, alongside the global financial 
instability and the indebtedness of Francophone Africa, resulting from the high interest rates. 
In the 1990s there was a devaluation of the CFAF and the monetary system adopted new 
legislations and economic strategies to recover from the damaging costs of the financial shocks 
of the late 1980s.70 
 The new monetary policies had the objective of regulating market liquidity, while 
moderating the monetary growth of the CFAF. After the structural adjustments and direct 
liquidity regulations of the 1980s, there was a shift of policies with the introduction of rate of 
interests, which meant indirect control of market liquidity and more economic liberalization. 
The new financial arrangements of the CFA franc zone played an important role in determining 
the economic growth and investment rate of CFA member states. Additionally, the efficiency 
of the economic policies was improved by the establishment of a council, whose aim is to 
advance the integration and standardization of national budget policies and the financial 
arrangements of WAEMU and CAEMU. The latter economic actions contributed to the fiscal 
consolidation and stability of the Franc zone; while also promoting better coordination among 
member states.71 Despite the latter economic and organizational improvements, there is a low 
level of integration within the CFA franc zone, regarding the different types of markets, such 
as capital, labour and goods. Furthermore, the institutional reforms of the 1970s-1980s have 
not guided CFA member countries towards better macroeconomic policies; consequently, 
states have been unsuccessful at saving foreign reserves and they entered in periods of 
recession.72 
In the late 1990s CFA institutions introduced new fiscal policies by following the example of 
the surveillance programs of the Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union 
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(EU). This multilateral surveillance gave the institutional power to interdict the financing of 
budget deficit; alongside the authority to punish the member states that do not respect the 
convergence criteria for macroeconomic performances. 73  These rigorous policies and the 
institutional arrangement of the monetary system have improved the macroeconomic trends of 
the zone; for example, there was a decreased government spending and a lower inflation rate.74 
Because of monetary stability CFA countries have also found more overseas markets to trade 
with.75  
However, it must be underlined that the CFA franc zone cannot achieve financial and 
monetary stability only through policies that try to regulate monetary stability.76 For instance, 
member states are incapable of taking appropriate measures to respond to asymmetrical shocks 
in the trade market.77 The CFA franc zone is made up by 14 countries, each one with a specific 
political and economic situation. According to the type of exports and imports, countries can 
face different trade shocks. Despite the differences among the CFA member states, the existing 
literature explains how price shocks are connected across Francophone Africa, and the 
monetary policies used in response to shocks have been suitable for every member state. 
Nevertheless, a financial response is more efficient according to how fast economic institutions 
intervene. Therefore, one can state that the costs of CFA membership are higher the more 
diverse member states are, and the longer time is employed by institutions to find a common 
monetary policy in response to shocks and inflation.78 
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Chapter 3 
What are the damaging CFA mechanisms? 
 
The disadvantages of the CFA monetary system 
 
Each CFA member has different socioeconomic needs and specific political situations. For this 
reason, monetary coordination within the Franc zone is not enough to deal with the 
organisational defaults of the system. The institutions should have the authority to choose the 
necessary economic measures independently from France and be able to design sustainable 
policies that are more pertinent to national requirements.79 
Since CFA policies are connected to the monetary policies of the Euro zone, member states 
find themselves having to deal with financial procedures that do not coincide with the needs of 
Francophone Africa. The latter economic discrepancies are one of the causes for financial 
inefficiency within the Franc zone.80 
Despite international credibility and a low rate of inflation, CFA countries struggle to 
react to asymmetrical trade shocks, because of the lack of sovereignty to make economic 
policies according to their national priorities. Francophone Africa cannot in fact adequately 
respond to trade fluctuations and their impact on domestic prices. On the contrary to those 
countries that have a flexible exchange rate and the possibility to better adjust their terms of 
trade shocks; for example, through currency devaluation.81 
Since there is no possibility for CFA countries to reduce the economic loss caused by 
trade shocks, a disadvantage is the inability to use nominal depreciation as a tool to regulate 
one’s national economy.82 Given that CFA countries cannot devalue their exchange rate, one 
way for them to react to fiscal deficit is by cutting investments and decreasing expenditures. 
This means that CFA member states are uncapable of adjusting their economies as much as 
they would need to, as they cannot use the CFAF exchange rate as a controlling instrument.83 
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Besides the unfavourable effect that changeable trade terms had on development, part of the 
economic damage has been caused by CFA policies. The latter economic arrangements are 
taken on a regional level, neglecting the budgetary responses that are needed on a national 
level.84 
When a country has not the authority to focus on monetary policies that efficiently target 
national issues, the possible benefits from a zone’s membership must be challenged. 85 
Most of CFA principles have hindered the development of member states. As a matter of fact, 
the economic stability ensured by the Franc zone is not enough to avoid the high administrative 
costs of convertibility procedures. Furthermore, the CFA principle regarding free capital 
movement between the CFA zone and France is not helpful because most private corporations 
operating in Francophone Africa are foreign owned. To attract foreign investments, France 
pushed Francophone Africa to decrease tax policies and as a consequence African countries do 
not see a real growth of their domestic incomes. On the contrary, CFA member states receive 
insignificant amounts of money from corporations’ tax revenues; whereas the latter continue 
to make higher profit and steal wealth from Africa.86 
 Moreover, it must be noted that France and other Western countries have the economic 
authority to set the global prices of commodities and dictate financial policies.87 
 
The acceptable rate of inflation of the BCEAO is the same one as the European Central Bank 
(ECB), that is 2%. The rate of inflation that must be respected by CFA member states limits 
the development of African countries, which need at least 7% of growth of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) to reduce national poverty and boost their economies. Infrastructure and 
development programs require in fact higher financial funds than the amount allowed by the 
fiscal margins of the Franc zone.88 
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Because of the former regulations and the centralization of CFA foreign exchange reserves in 
French operations accounts, CFA countries have low savings and liquidity.89 
The fact that they must ask to the French Treasury in order to access so their own national 
funds, it means that CFA states must first go through slow and unfavourable measures. 
 
According to cooperation arrangements between CFA member states and France, the African 
Council of Ministers is the administrative body with the power to modify the value of CFAF. 
De facto, Francophone Africa does not seem to have the exclusive control upon its currency, 
as the French administrators are the only ones to have veto power. 
Additionally, the French Treasury has the authority to manipulate CFA policies, particularly 
the ones concerning the ruling of the operations accounts of member countries. In addition to 
the strong influence that France has upon the zone, France gains benefits by being the first 
country CFA members must trade with. 90 For instance, France sets restrictions on the amount 
of import in the zone, alongside the minimum quantity of French products that must be 
imported by CFA members. Franco-African trade agreements hinder CFA members from 
trading with one another and with other non-African countries. Because of this pattern of 
dependency, African countries struggle to compete in the global market and initiate a process 
of industrialization. 91 
For this reason, CFA states have not achieved yet a successful economic and industrial 
diversification. The low degree of diversification of exports that characterizes Francophone 
Africa is the result of the economic structure inherited from the colonial period, when the 
production of resources was adapted to French requests. In simple words: the quantity of coffee 
produced in Francophone Africa is way higher than the actual amount of local consumption; 
whereas a highly used agricultural product such as cassava is less cultivated because of the low 
demand in Europe. 
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It is in France’s interest to maintain its colonial heritage. An economic dominance that is 
facilitated with the collaboration of a corrupted African élite, called the “messieurs Afrique” 
who pursue their personal interests, along with the French ones.92 
The CFA monetary system has contributed to impoverish Francophone Africa and like 
Professor Nicolas Agbohou explained in his books, it represents the absence of national 
sovereignty. Being part of the Franc zone means inadequate social and economic development, 
alongside the financial subordination of 14 African countries to France. CFA member states in 
fact lack liquidity because of the limiting monetary policies of the FT and CFA institutions. 
Meanwhile, their economic and administrative autonomy is constantly threatened by the veto 
power of French representants within CFA establishments.93 
For many African countries it is difficult to implement taxation on citizens and as a 
result, national revenues lack of money to invest in social welfare services and national 
industrialization. Moreover, Francophone Africa has insufficient funds to boost industrial 
development and improve social services, because of the OA in the French Treasury. 94 The 
required deposit of foreign asset is debited, which means that the FT receives periodically an 
interest rate paid by CFA member states.95 Although the interest rate is low, in the long term it 
becomes a high cost for CFA countries.96 
According to a report released by the National Assembly of the French parliament in 
1992, the CFAF held in the OA add up to French foreign exchange reserves. As a matter of 
fact, the Bank of France uses the money of African countries to make financial transactions in 
the market of trading currencies on behalf of African institutions, and to pay French financial 
liabilities and funds for public debt.97 
Since large part of the monetary resources detained by the Bank of France comes from 
Francophone Africa, France’s wealth highly depends on its former colonies.98 For instance, in 
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1991 the BEAC stated that French foreign currency reserves, including financial holdings in 
trading accounts, had increased by $ 247.8 billion.99 
 
The fact that the CFAF is pegged to a strong currency such as the Euro, it makes it difficult for 
CFA member states to address the economic priorities and developmental issues of the zone. 
The development of the manufacturing sector keeps been delayed in Francophone Africa, 
which limits the zone to export raw natural resources for transformation and agricultural 
products, while struggling to provide food security to African people. The specialization in the 
export of primary goods leads to economic instability because of the negative impact of trade 
shocks.100 
 
The right to self-determination, the equal opportunity to have economic sovereignty have been 
denied to Francophone Africa, through the establishment of a system characterized by financial 
policies, whose negative effects outweigh the benefits. For example, how the fixed exchange 
rate of the CFAF and the OA in the FT continue to enrich France with African foreign exchange 
reserves. In fact, Franck Merceron, head of an NGO, stated that fixed parity with a strong 
currency, such as the euro, causes an overvaluation of the CFAF and a high loss in market 
prices.101 
Furthermore, the presence of French commissioners in CFA institutions represents a 
structural impediment for the achievement of economic emancipation in Francophone Africa. 
Like Professor Jean-Placide Kezza writes in one of his books, France implemented a subtle 
system of theft that offers economic stability and low inflation to former African colonies, 
while ensuring easy access to natural resources and primary goods to French corporates.102 
Another element that contributes to increase French profit is a CFA monetary restriction, that 
does not allow the currencies of WAEMU and CAEMU to be interchangeable. As a result, it 
has been difficult for Francophone Africa to expand intra-regional and continental trade. In 
addition, CFA countries struggled to increase economic relations within Francophone Africa 
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due to the specialization in the export of resources toward Europe, alongside restrictive CFA 
norms that restrain African trade integration.103 
Jean Boissonat, member of the Monetary Committee of the Bank of France, admitted in 1960 
that the Franc zone enabled France to have access to primary goods without having always to 
directly pay for the natural resources and agricultural products.104 The CFA franc zone can thus 
be considered as a system that has been dispossessing Francophone Africa from its own 
monetary and natural resources. Abdoulaye Wade, former Senegalese President, once asked 
how it is possible that the BCEAO continues to deposit billions of euro in international markets, 
and at the same time CFA countries hardly have funds to boost national industrialization and 
finance public services. 
Besides being deprived of the 50% of their foreign exchange assets, CFA member states must 
deposit a certain amount of gold stocks in the OA to cover the guarantee of CFAF convertibility 
with euro. The estimated value of African gold stock in the Bank of France in 2001 was around 
CFAF 20,528 billion.105 
However, it is unlikely for CFA countries to have a deficit in the OA because of legal 
clauses. In case CFA reserves in the French Treasury would be negative, there are procedures 
that must be followed before receiving financial consultancy from the FT. This means that the 
so-called “free convertibility guarantee” is not an automatic process, in the contrary it is the 
last step of assistance for CFA member states. For this reason, it can be considered more 
theoretical than real, as it is improbable that all 14 member-states will show a deficit in their 
OA.106 
 
It must be highlighted that the CFA system was established as a geopolitical strategy. There 
are in fact statements by French politicians who affirmed with no shame that the French 
government took into primary consideration national interests, when making cooperation 
agreements with African countries. For example, the French diplomat JM Bregber who claims 
in an article that the Franc zone restricted the economic power of former French African. 
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As a result, France earned money from the deposit commissions of the CFAF in the OA; while 
French corporations took advantage from lucrative contracts signed with an often corrupted 
African political élite.107 
Even the former French president François Mitterand said that France robbed Africa for many 
years and there was more money going from Francophone Africa to France than vice versa.108 
Francophone Africa is thus trapped in a status quo of relative economic stability and low rate 
inflation, whilst it has no real chance to improve its economic sovereignty and development.109  
African French colonies achieved independence around the 1960s, yet the Franc zone 
allowed France to maintain intact its economic domination on Francophone Africa. Even the 
acronym of the colonial monetary system was not changed over time, which indicates that 
during the process of decolonization, the remaining colonial structures and dynamics were 
changed only superficially. 
 
Who are the actors benefiting the most from the Franc zone? 
 
As the economist Tchundjang Pouemi said: ‘France is the only country in the world which has 
succeeded in having its own currency circulated in politically independent countries.’110 
Professor Pouemi specified ‘politically independent’ because the CFA system limits the liberty 
of monetary policymaking of African states. Despite the process of ‘Africanisation’ of the 
officials in the CFA institutions, French representants still have high positions, which allow 
them to maintain France’s dominance in the decision-making process.111 
 Decolonization has not modified the balance of power between France and 
Francophone Africa. A colonial system has remained intact and what is questionable is not 
only the monetary system per se, but the fact that French officials have veto power within CFA 
institutions and that African countries must deposit half of their foreign exchange reserves in 
the FT. There is no monetary union that has the same mechanism as the Franc zone. 
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In response to the slow economic growth of Francophone Africa and the lack of monetary 
sovereignty, CFA countries demanded more flexibility to France, concerning the exchange rate 
between CFAF and Euro. France agreed to inform in advance African member states in case 
of a devaluation of the Euro, but regardless of this concession, CFA countries are still affected 
by any modification of the Euro’s exchange rate and the variability in the trade market. 
The economic growth of CFA countries is restrained by trade agreements with France, which 
outline that the ex-colonial power must be the main trading partner of African countries. 
Although CFA member states have trade partnerships with different countries, the quantity of 
products imported from France remains around 40% and 60%. 
 It must also be noted that the Franc zone is highly influenced by the trend of European 
stock markets, alongside France’s economy. When the prices of goods increase in France, the 
prices of French products exported in the Franc zone grow; which means that the consumption 
of French goods is consumed by a restricted and privileged African élite. 
The high prices of imported products indirectly influence the costs of local goods, making it 
difficult for most of the locals to have access to certain products. 
 
The CFA monetary system does not contribute to the industrialization and economic 
development of Francophone Africa, since social services are not improved and most of the 
population struggles to have access to many goods. 
The actors that benefit the most from the Franc zone are French and other European corporates, 
the African political élite and small groups of local entrepreneurs.112 
Overall, CFA members are the African countries with the lowest GDP growth. 113  In 
comparison to other Sub-Saharan African states, living standards have not improved as much 
as pro-CFA belief said that they would.114 
 
Furthermore, the academic research by Bernard Vinay showed how the FT manages CFA 
policies, regarding credit and savings. He explained how the latter policies reflect neo-classical 
economic principles and they delineate the centralized decision-making process of the Franc 
zone. Besides being inadequate for the economic and social scenarios of Francophone Africa, 
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orthodox conceptions of credit and savings have prevented CFA countries from creating 
national budgets according to the financial and social priorities of each state. 
Marcel Rudloff told to Dr. Kerfalla Yansané that the financial stagnation of Francophone 
Africa is due to the double standard of the imposed CFA economic conditions. For instance, 
he remarks how CFA member states have a low maximum amount of money that they can 
borrow from the French Treasury; to the contrary of Western countries that rarely adopt low 
credit ceilings in their economies.115 
The imposition mentioned by Marcel Rudloff indicates the hegemonic role of Eurocentric 
paradigms in the sphere of knowledge. That is the European tendency of viewing non-European 
cultures and histories as less meaningful. The Eurocentric thought tends to erase other forms 
of ontology and epistemology, through a process of universalization of European discourses. 
For instance, neo-classical economic principles- such as the exclusive role played by rational 
consumers, along with the elements of supply and demand in setting prices and market 
deregulation- are often considered universal.116 
In this case study, they have been instituted within the Franc zone, regardless of the national 
contests and needs of CFA countries.117 
 
The strict mechanisms of credit and savings regulation do not allow member states to benefit 
from CFA membership. In addition, most of the banks in the Franc zone are foreign owned and 
the latter commercial actors are the ones managing the distribution of CFA credits and savings, 
according to private interests and short-term arrangements.118 Most of the French banks in 
Francophone Africa offer loans with a 6% rate of interest. According to Senegalese Prime 
Minister Abdoul Mbaye, banks’ high interest rates contribute to slow down the economic 
growth of the Franc zone, along with France’s control over the decision-making process in 
CFA financial management.119  
It must be noted how the priorities of the Franc zone are highly influenced by the FT and other 
foreign actors, whose agenda is set by private interests, rather than the goal of improving the 
social and economic development of Francophone Africa. 
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France’s colonial legacy is thus visible in those sectors that are still under the monopoly of 
foreign capital.120 
 
There is no real investment to boost a process of industrialization in African countries. In the 
contrary, the same asymmetrical political economy of the colonial era has been kept, as CFA 
credit policies favour African exports of natural resources and agricultural goods, whilst 
reducing import regulations. Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont argue in one of their academic 
books that ‘The Franc zone constitutes a single preferential economic area within which France can 
freely pursue a purely neo-colonial policy of economic exploitation of the African countries.’121 
 
Nevertheless, the Franc zone is characterized by complex relations on a national, regional and 
international level. Like S. Mbaye explained in one of his articles, France cannot be completely 
blamed for the poverty from which Francophone Africa suffer. Most of the leaders of CFA 
countries facilitated the institutionalization of France’s control and exploitation. They 
established a complementary relationship with France and used public funds for private 
interests.122 The African politicians who attempted to increase the economic sovereignty of 
their countries and proposed to implement development strategies according to national needs 
were obstructed by French interference. 
Some African states also decided to keep the colonial economic policies based on export with 
the hope of attracting foreign exchange. However, the market is mainly controlled by French 
and other Western companies; as a result, an increase in production did not lead to a higher 
African income. The latter pattern contributed to the failure of the development of an 
independent market and industrial sector in Africa.123 
For Western corporates it has also been easy to penetrate in the market and economic system 
of Francophone Africa because of the relations between foreign companies and the local 
bourgeoisie. An élite that is keener on establishing a dictatorship through conservative norms, 
than liberating Francophone Africa from Western European constraints.124 
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The Franc zone is often described as a monetary system that helped African countries to have 
economic stability, after gaining political independence in the 1960s. 
The low rate of inflation and the apparent economic stability of CFA countries represent the 
visible peak of an iceberg in the ocean. Once the Franc zone is analysed more deeply, it is 
possible to identify the hierarchical structure of power and the exploitative dynamics that 
damage African development and economic sovereignty. 
In the last years, dissatisfaction with the CFA system has increased within Francophone Africa, 
as it became clearer that the Franc zone has kept its member-states heavily dependent on France. 
For instance, CFA countries still have to consult the FT before having a transaction with 
another currency, as they must use the euro to buy or sell. In Holger Engberg’s words: 
 
A resident of Senegal requiring U.S. dollars first obtains euro by selling CFAF, and then purchasing 
dollars for euro. The sale of CFAF appears as a debit on the OA of the BCEAO, and the purchase of 
dollars is a debit on the exchange account of CFA banks with the French stabilisation fund. 
 
Nowadays, there is more awareness of the inefficient and bias norms of the Franc zone, and it 
has become more difficult for the African political élite to justify France’s dominant role in the 
monetary system.125 
The anti-CFA movement has grown in response to France’s failed attempt to discuss with 
African élites about certain financial arrangements, such as exchange and parity rate policies. 
Those who have a critical perspective toward the Franc zone demanded more flexibility in 
decision-making, alongside greater management authority over national earnings. 
 
The most recent data gathered for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) indicates 
that only one CFA country has a high result in relation to the Human Development Index. 
Whereas three other member states have average results and the remaining 10 countries rank 
in low positions. Thus, the rise of the anti-CFA movement is more than understandable, as 
more research studies show that the Franc zone is mainly a restrain for the achievement of 
social and economic development in Francophone Africa.126  
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Chapter 4 
The continuation of an oppressive system 
 
The unfinished process of decolonization 
 
Decolonization is usually described in a way that it disregards the social, political and economic 
struggle of the African national movements.127 It is viewed as a process that ends foreign 
political domination and what is forgotten is the irreversible and disruptive impact of 
colonialism on culture, social and economic structures of African societies.128 
The process of decolonization was designed in a way to make the ex-colonies think that once 
they would have gained political independence, they would reach a level of complete 
sovereignty, hence being able to appeal to their right of self-determination. Nevertheless, 
decolonization was characterized by a different reality that perpetuated dependency between 
France and its former African colonies. In Frantz Fanon’s words, ‘Imperialism leaves behind 
germs of rot which we must clinically detect and remove from our land and from our minds as well.’ 
 
According to Professor Tony Chafer, there are scholars who only focused on French policy-
making during decolonization and how France guided its colonies towards a diplomatic 
transition. The latter approach tends to portray Franco-African decolonization as a successful 
and non-violent process, led by philanthropic French politicians. The transition to political 
independence was indeed mitigated by diplomatic agreements between France and African 
countries. 
However, the new French slogan of cooperation was not influenced by France’s generosity, it 
was a strategy to control African nationalist movements and ‘perpetuate a colonial type of 
domination under a rejuvenated legal cover'.129 The French government had a reform project, 
whose objective was to preserve France’s influence in Africa by any means necessary. The 
creation of the CFAF is an example of France’s attempt to justify its authority in Africa and to 
maintain its former colonies economically linked to the colonial power. France successfully 
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institutionalised its authority over African states through the establishment of the Franc zone 
and cooperation agreements.130 
It is important to underline how the impact of colonialism in Francophone Africa has not ended 
with the achievement of political independence, that is decolonization. In order to achieve 
complete autonomy and freedom, it is yet necessary to extend the process of decolonization to 
the economic, cultural and psychological sphere. 
For instance, to better understand the effect of colonialism, it is important to take into 
consideration the book “Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature” 
by Ngugi Wa Thiongo’o. He explains how colonialism is based on the control of the production 
of a community’s wealth and culture, through military and political subjugation. Ngugi Wa 
Thiongo’o highlights the interdependence between economic/political control and mental 
control. The latter two aspects of colonialism can cause a deliberate annihilation of a people’s 
unity and belief in their cultural heritage.131 
 
During the period of decolonization, it was thought that there would have been a slow but 
constant decrease of colonial influence and a new diversification of the economic North-South 
relations. After 6o years of African independence, France is still a predominant actor in 
Francophone Africa and the basis of world structures of power and economy has not 
changed.132 France demonstrated to be uncapable to renounce to its colonial attitude and adapt 
to the transformation of African societies. In addition, the rise of international rivalry for the 
access to African resources pushed France to strengthen its authority upon Francophone 
Africa.133  
 
Coloniality within the Franc zone 
Since the colonial era, France mutated rather than changed its African policy approach. France 
maintained the colonial structure that allowed to control different dimensions of Francophone 
Africa, such as economy, politics and culture. 
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The former structure of management refers to the Colonial Matrix of Power (CMP), which 
found its continuity within coloniality.134 The term coloniality constitutes a matrix whose 
structure allows to have control over various dimensions, for example from political 
administration to cultural subjectivity. Coloniality operates through the exploitation of Global 
South’s labour and natural resources; it feeds an international financial capitalist system based 
on white supremacy and the universalization of Euromerican values.135 
 
France’s constant intervention in African political and economic affairs represent a neo-
colonial threat to CFA countries’ independence.136 France’s neo-colonial approach manifests 
itself in the attempts to disrupt economic negotiations between Francophone Africa and other 
countries, such as China, the U.S.A and Brazil. France’s African policy is in fact motivated by 
the belief of having the legitimacy to be the first economic partner of CFA countries.  
France’s geopolitical influence and economic strength have diminished after World War II and 
since then France tried to reach once again its status as a global power. Thus, it is not really a 
matter of financially aiding African countries, rather a strategy to maintain France’s domination 
over Francophone Africa through the CFA monetary system.137 After 60 years of independence, 
African states still find themselves constrained in a North-South relationship with their former 
colonial power. 
 
Although the raw materials found in Africa are essential for the functioning of French high-
technology industries, France’s dependency towards Francophone Africa is minimised. 
France’s economic strength grew because of colonialism and it still depends on the agricultural 
and mineral resources supplied by African countries, alongside the potential that African 
markets have for French manufactured products.138 
Trade relations between France and Francophone Africa are characterized by 
asymmetry, because of the disproportionate commercial dynamics. For example, 50% of trade 
is realised with European countries and only 5% is intra-African trade. The Franc zone does 
not incentivize intra-CFA trade, in the contrary the two CFAF currencies are not 
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interchangeable and member states from the two unions must always exchange currency with 
the FT first. 
Most of the companies and banks in Francophone Africa are French owned and for African 
entrepreneurs it is difficult to compete in the market and to ask loans to the FT, as it prioritizes 
French corporates. The economic and production structure have thus remained unchanged 
since the colonial period and African countries still find themselves trapped as suppliers of 
natural resources and agricultural products.139 
 
Furthermore, France’s authority in CFA institutions and trade activities is parallel to French 
indirect domination over the political and cultural dimensions. Although after decolonization 
the branches of the French network changed form, the colonial roots remained institutionalised. 
This allowed France to continue its influence over African bureaucracies and entrepreneur 
élites through a multidimensional system. 140 
CFA institutions, trade agreements and cultural institutions are historically linked to France 
and the fact that many important administrative roles are held by French officials reinforces 
the economic, political and cultural control of CFA states by France.141 
Despite the dismantling of French direct colonial rule over Francophone Africa, colonialism 
was not overcome. A mutated system was established to preserve the hierarchical global 
structure of international relations. Colonialism was not replaced by a ‘post-colonial world’ 
characterized by a different political and economic structure, direct colonial administration was 
simply replaced by coloniality.142 The CFA monetary system is an example of what coloniality 
stands for, as the Franc zone represents the continuation of the French colonial legacy. 
Nkrumah Kwame elaborated the concept of neo-colonialism and the following words 
of his analysis suggest a parallelism with the hierarchical structure of Franco-African relations 
and the maintenance of the CFA monetary system: 
 
The neo-colonial state may be obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the 
exclusion of competing products elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial state 
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may be secured by payment towards the cost of running the State, by the provision of civil servants in 
positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the 
imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power.143 
 
The French rhetoric of economic progress and trade liberalization facilitated the continuation 
of the CFA monetary system and coloniality. The slogan of modernity obscured the 
asymmetrical structure of international relations, in this case study between France and 
Francophone Africa.144 The liberalization of commerce mainly preserved the imposed colonial 
structure of monoculture, in favour of the financial interests of French companies.145 
 
France presented itself as the guarantor of financial stability and the administrative consultant 
for Francophone Africa, while stating that CFA members have the freedom to withdraw from 
the zone. However, there are cases of African leaders who attempted to oppose France’s 
dominance over the economic and political dimension of Francophone Africa. As a result, 
several African politicians and academics were assassinated, such as: Thomas Sankara- 
Burkina Faso’s resistance leader, Patrice Lumumba- DRC’s independence leader, Sylvanus 
Olympio- Togo’s first President, Osene Afanda- Cameroonian anti-colonial resistance leader, 
Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi- author of Money, Servitude and Freedom: the monetary 
repression of Africa. Other African politicians who openly opposed the CFAF saw their 
governments being sabotaged by French backed coups d’état; for instance, Ahmed Sékou 
Touré’s Guinea, Modibo Keita’s Mali and Ivory Coast under Laurent Gbagbo.146  
The most recent example is the 2011 coup d’état and NATO’s controversial intervention in 
Libya. Although Libya is not part of the Franc zone, Muammar Gaddafi was a pan-Africanist 
pioneer and France feared his proposal of introducing an African currency based on gold-
standard, a single currency that could have freed CFA countries and bankrupt various Western 
states.147 Regardless of French political and military interference in African national matters, 
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there are CFA norms that allow CFA members to withdraw from the zone only if unanimity is 
reached during a vote. 
One lasting effect of the imposed CFAF and its enduring colonial institutions is the way it 
defines the political and economic choices available for African governments.148 Because of 
the imposed CFA monetary institutions, Francophone Africa found itself restrained by a 
colonial model of political economy.149 
The economic rights of Francophone Africa seem in fact non-existent in comparison to the 
privileges and authority of France. The colonial dynamics of unequal juridical rights persist 
through the economic dependency perpetuated by the Franc zone.150 
 
Critical and decolonial authors attempt to remind to the international community the unfinished 
process of decolonization. For this reason, I chose the theory of coloniality of power to 
investigate the disadvantages of the Franc zone and to question whether the CFAF can be 
considered as a French neo-colonial tool. 
The framework of coloniality provides an analytical approach that exposes French colonial 
dynamics of subjectivation; hence giving me a tool to critically analyse the Franc zone and 
write a decolonial thesis.151 
Decoloniality can be considered as the counterreaction of neo-colonialism, as it deals with the 
asymmetry of international geopolitical relations; in this case study between France and 
Francophone Africa. 
 
Having coloniality as a key concept of reference allows those scholars who are in the 
subjugated side of power-knowledge relations to be aware and critically analyse dominant 
paradigms and hierarchical structures, that constitute the economic, political, social and 
cultural spheres of Franco-African relations.152 
An interesting aspect about the notion of coloniality of power introduced by Quijano is the 
central role played by racism, viewed as the basis that organizes the hierarchy of international 
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relations and the global system.153 Quijano explained the interrelation between the world’s 
division of labour and a racial hierarchy that defines the asymmetric system of international 
relations. Taking into consideration the general framework of Quijano, the Franc zone can be 
an example of how the structure of coloniality of power and its racial hierarchy are arranged 
and function. Colonialism was symmetrically correlated with racism and the race factor became 
a fundamental tool to defend European control over Africa. A process of transfiguration of 
African people justified the European mission of civilization, alongside the policies of colonial 
domination.154 
The CFA system reveals its racist roots in its structure and norms.155 The hierarchical 
organization of the Franc zone is built on the dominant role of France in the decision-making 
process. The pyramid structure of the zone organizes itself around the authority of the French 
Treasury and of French officials in CFA institutions. Likewise, the global distribution of labour 
and trade is based on a racist hierarchy, in which Euro-American countries are situated on the 
highest point of the system. The matrix of world power and the global configuration of financial 
capitalism are therefore interlinked to one another, along with their indirect impact on cultural 
intersubjectivities.156 
 
There is a link between the development of France’s national identity and its relationship with 
African colonies. A relationship based on a radical separation and dualism.157 Francophone 
Africa represents the “Other” against which France can define its role as a superior Western 
power and a “developed” country, while maintaining its privileged trade and economic 
relations with CFA states.158 
The colonial matrix of power was in fact configured into a polarized world: the Zone of Being- 
where those who dominate global power structures can set the standards of knowledge 
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production and modernity- and the Zone of Non-Being, the area that provides force of labour 
and natural resources.159 
French (white) supremacy maintains its power over Francophone Africa by appealing 
to the administrative stability of the French Treasury and the alleged competence of French 
officials and entrepreneurs. France puts itself on a higher pedestal in comparison to African 
countries and it masks the hierarchy of Franco-African relations with so-called financial aid 
and guidelines for the management of economic policies. 
France’s white saviour complex reinforces its colonial legacy with French representatives who 
have high management positions in CFA institutions and privileged veto power. 
Franco-African relations demonstrate how modernity is parallel to coloniality. The other side 
of the coin of modernity is in fact a monetary system that denies economic sovereignty and 
continues to confine Francophone Africa to the role of a supplier of raw and agricultural 
materials. 
 
The notion of coloniality allows to identify which forms of control have remained intact in 
Francophone Africa, despite the formal end of French colonialism. 160  The process of 
decolonization has not abolished certain structures of domination, such as the racial hierarchy 
of international relations and the global division of labour.161 
The concept of coloniality is a point of reference to recognise colonial continuities within the 
Franc zone. The identification of the former forms of dominance, alongside the resulting 
disadvantages for CFA countries make it easier to link the CFA system with the framework of 
neo-colonialism. It is in fact fundamental to point out the entanglement between the Franc zone, 
coloniality and neo-colonialism, since it raises awareness about the myth of decolonization and 
the so-called post-colonial era.162 By unfolding the connection between the Franc zone and 
neo-colonialism, together with the damages of CFA membership, the reader is forced to view 
Franco-African relations from a critical perspective. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main objective of the thesis was to answer to the following question- What are the CFA 
neo-colonial conditions undermining economic sovereignty & development in the Franc zone? 
The study tries to raise awareness regarding the necessity of breaking the chains from a 
monetary system, that was inherited from the colonial era and keeps Francophone Africa in a 
submissive position through a French neo-colonial strategy. 
The focus of the thesis is in fact the analysis of the CFA conditions that have a negative impact 
on the Franc zone, and to what extent the latter zone can be considered as a neo-colonial tool 
that perpetuates the damaging structure of the colonial matrix of power. 
The study refers to the structure of Franco-African relations as damaging because 
France has made money out of the exploitation of African resources, while maintaining a 
dominant role in CFA institutions. France’s authority hindered states from achieving economic 
sovereignty, consequently reducing their possibility to reach a higher degree of 
industrialization and economic independence. Furthermore, the argument of neo-colonialism 
is based on a country’s control of the monetary system and economic policies from an external 
state, which is in compliance with the findings obtained from this research. 
 
Francophone Africa is an important territory for France, because of its natural resources and 
primary goods that foster the economic growth of French industrial and financial sectors. 
The Franc zone is in fact a monetary system that allows France to maintain its privileged access 
to Francophone Africa’s material wealth, whilst managing the financial and monetary policies 
of its former colonies. After centuries of different forms of oppression and exploitation, 
Francophone Africa reached political independence through the process of decolonization. 
Nevertheless, new forms of economic control were established with the end of 
decolonization and they allowed the beginning of neo-colonial Franco-African relations. 
Francophone Africa found itself subjugated to France under new trade agreements, French 
imposed standards on how the process of decision-making should be conducted and the 
persistent presence of French officials in CFA institutions. 
 
The French Treasury and French officials in CFA institutions put themselves on a pedestal 
from which they believe to have the legitimacy to tell CFA members what the issues of 
Francophone Africa are and how they should solve them. A pervasive attitude with colonial 
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and racist roots that tends to justify the hierarchical structure of the international community 
and the universalization of the superiority Eurocentric principles.163 
France’s foreign policies appear as financial and management aid, yet they mask the 
continuation of colonialism through different forms. Colonization was the physical settlement 
and administrative control of African territories by European countries. It can be viewed as a 
material process parallel to colonialism, which distinguished itself from the figurative 
occupation of the local forms of ontology and epistemology, that consequently diminished 
African history and cultural heritage.164 
 
This thesis attempts to decolonize the conception of the Franc zone by highlighting the 
financial disadvantages of the CFAF and linking the discourse to the analytical framework of 
coloniality of power and neo-colonialism The thesis contributes to expose the damaging effects 
of the zone, such as the loss of liquidity due to the confiscation of 50% of the foreign exchange 
assets of each CFA country and long-term impoverishment. Because of this systematic 
confiscation, African countries are deprived of the possibility to have private and public 
savings. CFA member states are forced to borrow a limited amount of their own seized 
monetary resources from the French Treasury.165 
 
Therefore, the Franc zone can be understood as a neo-colonial device that prevents 
Francophone Africa from achieving economic autonomy and development, whilst perpetuating 
oppressive trends that started with the colonization of Africa by France. The maintenance of 
the CFAF allows France to preserve a dominant position in the hierarchical Franco-African 
relations. 
By critically analysing the Franc zone and decolonizing Franco-African relations, the 
study indicates how the structure of the CFA system extracts wealth from member states, 
helping French corporations to benefit from the exploitation of African land and natural 
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resources.166 Thus, it is a monetary system that deprives 14 African countries from achieving 
complete economic independence and development.  
 
A country’s currency is supposed to be a device for economic growth and monetary sovereignty 
should help addressing national needs and reaching financial stability. 
Africa is rich and an extremely high amount of wealth keeps leaving the continent. It is 
important to rethink the role of France in Francophone Africa and advocate for the liberatory 
project od decoloniality, in order to dismantle the economic and social disadvantages caused 
by colonial dynamics that remain unchanged until present day. 
 African civil society should advocate for change, requesting for new financial policies 
that could bring equitable development to all African citizens, rather than norms whose 
objective is restricted to privatisation and trade liberalization. Francophone Africa should in 
fact target its economic policies, in a way that wealth is redistributed, and local lands and 
resources are protected from foreign exploitation.167 
The Franc zone should prioritize the interests and needs of African people by delinking itself 
from the dominant role of France in the system. A pan-African monetary zone may sound 
utopic and difficult to accomplish, but not impossible. The withdrawal from the Franc zone 
would represent one first step to challenge the enduring colonial matrix of power and reclaim 
the right of self-determination for African countries. 
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